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Abstract
In belief revision theory, conditionals are often interpreted
via the Ramsey test. However, the classical Ramsey Test fails
to take into account a fundamental feature of conditionals as
used in natural language: typically, the antecedent is relevant
to the consequent. Rott has extended the Ramsey Test by
introducing so-called difference-making conditionals that en-
code a notion of relevance. This paper explores difference-
making conditionals in the framework of Spohn’s ranking
functions. We show that they can be expressed by stan-
dard conditionals together with might conditionals. We prove
that this reformulation is fully compatible with the logic of
difference-making conditionals, as introduced by Rott. More-
over, using c-representations, we propose a method for in-
ductive reasoning with sets of difference-making conditionals
and also provide a method for revising ranking functions by
a set of difference-making conditionals.
1 Introduction
On most accounts of conditionals, a conditional of the form
‘If A then B’ is true or accepted if (but not only if) B is
true or accepted and A does not undermine B’s truth or ac-
ceptance. On the suppositional account, for instance, if you
believe B and the supposition that A is true does not re-
move B, you may (and must!) accept ‘If A, then B’. On
this account, there is no need that A furthers B or supports
B or is evidence or a reason for B. This does not square
well with the way we use conditionals in natural language.
Skovgaard-Olsen et al. (2019) have conducted an empiri-
cal study and concluded that the positive relevance reading
(reason-relation reading) of indicative conditionals is a con-
ventional aspect of their meaning which cannot be cancelled
‘without contradiction’. This, of course, is helpful only if
the notion of contradiction is clear, but we aim to flesh out
the positive relevance reading in an intuitive and yet precise
way. The difference-making conditionals studied in this pa-
per aim at capturing the relevance reading that is conveyed
semantically or pragmatically by the utterance of condition-
als in natural language. (Unfortunately, use of the term ‘rel-
evance conditionals’ has been preempted by a completely
different use in linguistics). Let us begin by giving an exam-
ple that illustrates what we mean by the term ‘relevance’:
Example 1. An agent wanted to escape the hustle and bustle
of the city and decided to move into an old farm house in
the countryside. Unfortunately, the weather quickly changed
and it became cold (c). Due to the low temperatures one of
the rather old pipes in the house broke (b) and the agent had
to call a plumber (p) to get the damage fixed.
In this example, it is clear that the cold temperatures are
the reason for the broken pipe. Yet, this is not well re-
flected if we use a standard conditional ‘If it is cold then
the pipe will break’. We would rather say that the pipe
broke because it was cold. The notion of relevance featuring
here is encoded in the Relevant Ramsey Test which governs
difference-making conditionals first introduced under a dif-
ferent name by Rott (1986) and then studied in Rott (2019).
Except for a very recent paper by Raidl (2020), the logic
of difference-making conditionals has been explored only in
a purely qualitative framework. We characterize difference-
making conditionals in the framework of Spohn’s (1988)
ranking functions and provide a simple and elegant seman-
tics which we can use to define an inductive representation,
that is, to build up an epistemic state from a (conditional)
knowledge base, as well as a revision method for difference-
making conditionals. Our main contributions in this paper
are the following:
• We transfer Rott’s notion of difference-making condition-
als to the framework of ordinal conditional functions and
reformulate the relevant Ramsey Test in this framework.
• We define an inductive representation for a set of
difference-making conditionals in the framework of rank-
ing functions.
• We set up a method for revising a ranking function by a set
of difference-making conditionals, and we elaborate this
general method for revising by a single difference-making
conditional in the ranking functions framework, based on
the c-revisions introduced by Kern-Isberner (2001).
• We compare the notion of evidence or support captured
by difference-making conditionals to the one offered in
related approaches like the ‘evidential conditionals’ of
Crupi and Iacona (2019a) or Spohn’s (2012) notion of
‘reason’.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In section
2, we define the formal preliminaries and notations used
throughout the paper. Section 3 summarizes concepts and
results from Rott’s (2019) work on difference-making con-
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ditionals. Then, in section 4, we define a ranking seman-
tics for difference-making conditionals via an OCF-version
of the Relevant Ramsey Test and prove the basic principles
using a reformulation of a difference-making conditional
as a pair of more standard conditionals. In section 5, we
construct an inductive representation for sets of difference-
making conditionals using c-representations. Section 6 in-
troduces a method for revising by difference-making con-
ditionals based on c-revisions in the framework of ranking
functions. In section 7, we discuss alternative approaches to
incorporating relevance in conditionals. The concluding sec-
tion 8 sums up our findings.
2 Formal Preliminaries
Let L be a finitely generated propositional language over
an alphabet Σ with atoms a, b, c, . . . and with formulas
A,B,C, . . .. For conciseness of notation, we will omit the
logical and-connector, writing AB instead of A ∧ B, and
overlining formulas will indicate negation, i.e., A means
¬A. The set of all propositional interpretations over Σ is de-
noted by ΩΣ. As the signature will be fixed throughout the
paper, we will usually omit the subscript and simply write Ω.
ω  A means that the propositional formula A ∈ L holds in
the possible world ω ∈ Ω; then ω is called a model ofA, and
the set of all models ofA is denoted by Mod(A). For propo-
sitions A,B ∈ L, A  B holds iff Mod(A) ⊆ Mod(B),
as usual. By slight abuse of notation, we will use ω both for
the model and the corresponding conjunction of all positive
or negated atoms. This will allow us to ease notation a lot.
Since ω  Ameans the same for both readings of ω, no con-
fusion will arise. The set of classical consequences of a set
of formulas A ⊆ L is Cn(A) = {B | A |= B}. The de-
ductively closed set of formulas which has exactly a subset
W ⊆ Ω as a model is called the formal theory of W and
defined as Th(W) = {A ∈ L | ω |= A for all ω ∈ W}.
We extendL to a conditional language (L|L) by introduc-
ing a conditional operator ( · | · ), so that (L|L) = {(B|A) |
A,B ∈ L}. (L|L) is a flat conditional language, no nest-
ing of conditionals is allowed. A is called the antecedent
of (B|A), and B is its consequent. (B|A) expresses ‘If A,
then (plausibly) B’. In the following, conditionals (B|A) ∈
(L|L) are referred to as standard conditionals or, if there is
no danger of confusion, simply conditionals.
We further extend our framework of conditionals to a lan-
guage with might conditionals /L|L . by introducing a might
conditional operator / ·|· . (the angle brackets are supposed
to remind the reader of a split diamond operator). For a
might conditional /D|C ., we call C the antecedent and D
the consequent. As for standard conditionals, /L|L . is a flat
conditional language, and /D|C . expresses ‘If C, then D
might be the case’. In a way, the might conditional /D|C .
is the negation of the standard conditional (D|C) (Lewis
1973). The former is accepted iff the latter isn’t.
A (conditional) knowledge base is a finite set of condi-
tionals ∆ = {(B1|A1), . . . , (Bn|An)} ∪ {/Bn+1|An+1 .,
. . . , /Bm|Am .}. To give an appropriate semantics to (stan-
dard resp. might) conditionals and knowledge bases, we
need richer semantic structures like epistemic states in the
sense of Halpern (2003), most commonly represented as
probability distributions, possibility distributions (Dubois
and Prade 2006) or ordinal conditional functions (Spohn
1988, 2012). A knowledge base is consistent if and only if
there is (a representation of) an epistemic state that accepts
the knowledge base, i.e., all conditionals in ∆.
Ordinal conditional functions (OCFs, also called ranking
functions) κ : Ω → N ∪ {∞}, with κ−1(0) 6= ∅, assign
to each world ω an implausibility rank κ(ω). OCFs were
first introduced by Spohn (1988). The higher κ(ω), the less
plausible ω is, and the normalization constraint requires that
there are worlds having maximal plausibility. Then one puts
κ(A) := min{κ(ω) | ω  A} and κ(∅) = ∞. Due to
κ−1(0) 6= ∅, at least one of κ(A) and κ(A) must be 0. A
proposition A is believed if κ(A) > 0, and the belief set of
a ranking function κ is defined as Bel(κ) = Th(κ−1{0}).
Definition 1. A (standard) conditional (B|A) is accepted
in an epistemic state represented by an OCF κ, written as
κ |= (B|A), iff κ(AB) < κ(AB) or κ(A) =∞.
That is, the verification of (B|A) is more plausible than
its falsification or the premise of the conditional is always
false.
Definition 2. A might conditionals /D|C . is accepted in
an epistemic state represented by an OCF κ, written as
κ |= /D|C ., if and only if κ 6|= (D|C) or κ(C) = ∞,
i.e., κ(CD) ≤ κ(CD) or κ(C) =∞.
Note that accepting a might conditional is not equivalent
to the acceptance of the conditional with negated consequent
(κ |= (D|C)) but weaker since it allows for indifference
between CD and CD. In this case both (D|C) and (D|C)
fail to be accepted.
3 The Ramsey Test, the Relevant Ramsey
Test and difference-making conditionals
In the following, let Ψ be an epistemic state of any general
format, and let Bel be an operator on belief states that as-
signs to Ψ the set of beliefs held in Ψ. Let ∗ be a revision
operator on epistemic states, and let (B|A) be a conditional.
The Ramsey Test (so-called after a footnote in Ramsey 1931)
was made popular by Stalnaker (1968). According to it, ‘If
A then B’ is accepted in a belief state just in case B is an
element of the belief set Bel(Ψ ∗A) that results from a revi-
sion of the belief state Ψ by the sentence A. Formally:
(RT) Ψ |= (B|A) iff B ∈ Bel(Ψ ∗A).
If belief states are identified with ranking functions, the
Ramsey Test reads as follows: κ |= (B|A) iff B ∈ Bel(κ ∗
A); this, taken together with Definition 1 implies a constraint
on κ∗A. The conditionB ∈ Bel(Ψ∗A) can be reformulated
using some basic properties of ranking functions:
B ∈ Bel(κ ∗A) = Th((κ ∗A)−1{0})
⇔ ∀ω ∈ min(Mod(κ ∗A)) it holds that ω |= B
⇔ (κ ∗A)(B) < (κ ∗A)(B)
⇔ (κ ∗A)(B) > 0 ⇔ κ ∗A |= B.
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We can also define a Ramsey Test for might conditionals:
Ψ |= /B|A . iff B 6∈ Bel(Ψ ∗A), that is, iff Ψ 6|= (B|A). Or
more specifically, in terms of ranking functions: κ |= /B|A .
iff B 6∈ Bel(κ ∗ A), that is, iff κ 6|= (B|A), which follows
from Definition 2. The condition B 6∈ Bel(Ψ ∗A) can again
be reformulated using some properties of ranking functions:
B 6∈ Bel(κ ∗A) = Th((κ ∗A)−1{0})
⇔ ∃ω ∈ min(Mod(κ ∗A)) such that ω |= B
⇔ (κ ∗A)(B) = 0 ⇔ κ ∗A 6|= B.
Given assumptions on belief revision in the tradition of
Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson (1985), Ramsey Test
conditionals are known to satisfy, among other things, the
following principles of And, Right Weakening, Cautious
Monotonicity, Cut and Or:
(And) If (B|A) and (C|A), then (BC|A).
(RW) If (B|A) and C ∈ Cn(B), then (C|A).
(CM) If (B|A) and (C|A), then (C|AB).
(Cut) If (B|A) and (C|AB), then (C|A).
(Or) If (C|A) and (C|B), then (C|A ∨B).
All of these principles are to be read as quantified over all
belief states Ψ: ‘(B|A)’ is short for ‘Ψ |= (B|A)’. Roughly,
a principle of the form ‘If ∆, then (B|A)’ is valid iff for
every belief state Ψ, if the conditionals mentioned in ∆ are
all accepted in Ψ, then (B|A) is accepted in Ψ, too.
The Ramsey Test falls squarely within the paradigm of
the suppositional account mentioned above. Assume that an
agent happens to believe B. Assume further that her beliefs
are consistent with A (or that she actually already believes
that A). Then, given a widely endorsed condition of belief
preservation, the Ramsey Test rules that the agent is com-
mitted to accepting the conditional (B|A). There need not
be any relation of relevance or support between A and B. In
particular, if you happen to believeA andB, this is sufficient
to require acceptance of (B|A).
How can the Ramsey Test be adapted to capture the idea
that the antecedent should be relevant to the consequent?
One straightforward way is to interpret conditionals as be-
ing contrastive: The antecedent should make a difference to
the consequent. In order to implement this idea without in-
troducing a dependence on the actual belief status of the an-
tecedent, Rott (2019) suggests the following Relevant Ram-
sey Test:
(RRT) Ψ |= AB iff B ∈ Bel(Ψ ∗A) and
B 6∈ Bel(Ψ ∗A).
We call conditionals that are governed by (RRT) difference-
making conditionals, and we have changed the notation here
from (B|A) to AB in order to mark our transition from
standard would conditionals to difference-making condi-
tionals. AB can be read as ‘If A, then (relevantly) B.’
Here the consequent is accepted if we revise the belief state
by the antecedent, but the consequent fails to be accepted
if we revise by the negation of the antecedent. Rott’s idea
was to liken conditionals to the natural-language connectives
‘because’ and ‘since’ that are widely taken to express the
contrast that a cause or a reason is making to its effect. Thus
Rott took to be an intrinsically contrastive connective. It
is important to note, however, that unlike ‘B becauseA’ and
‘Since A, B’, which can only be accepted if A is believed to
be true, the acceptance of AB neither entails nor is en-
tailed by a particular belief status of A. (RRT) provides a
clear and simple doxastic semantics for relevance-encoding
conditionals with antecedents and consequents that may be
arbitrary compounds of propositional sentences.
Since (RRT) is more complex than (RT), it is hardly
surprising that difference-making conditionals don’t satisfy
some of the usual principles for standard conditionals such
as CM, Cut and Or. Rott discusses some examples showing
how CM, Cut and OR can fail with difference-making con-
ditionals. The most striking fact, however, is that difference-
making conditionals do not even validate Right Weakening
which has long seemed entirely innocuous to conditional
logicians. Rott even called the invalidity of RW the hall-
mark of difference-making conditionals and indeed of the
relevance relation. Another notable property of difference-
making conditionals is that B ∈ Cn(A) does not imply that
AB is accepted. If B is accepted “anyway” (like for in-
stance a logical truth B is), then A cannot be relevant to B,
even if it implies B.
That many of the familiar principles for standard condi-
tionals become invalid for difference-making conditionals
does not mean that there is no logic to the latter. Here are
the basic principles of difference-making conditional oper-
ators that Rott (2019) shows to be complete with respect to
the basic AGM postulates for belief revision (actually Rott
uses a slight weakening of the basic AGM postulates that
allows that revisions by non-contradictions may result in in-
consistent belief sets):
(0) ⊥⊥.
(1) If ABC, then AB or AC.
(2a) AC iff (AAC and AA ∨ C).
(2b) AAC iff (notAA∨C and AA).
(3–4) ⊥A ∨ C iff (⊥A and AA ∨ C).
(5) A ∨B⊥ iff (A⊥ and B⊥).
(6) If Cn(A) = Cn(B) and Cn(C) = Cn(D),
then: AC iff BD.
All of these principles are to be read as quantified over all
belief states Ψ: ‘AC’ is short for ‘Ψ |= AC’ and ‘not
A C’ is short for ‘Ψ 6|= A C’. Roughly, a principle
of the form ‘If ∆, then Γ’ is valid iff for every belief state
Ψ, if the (possibly negated) conditionals mentioned in ∆ are
all accepted in Ψ, then the (possibly negated) conditionals
mentioned in Γ are accepted in Ψ, too.
It follows from principles (0) – (6) that (And) is also
valid for difference-making conditionals. (1) is dual to
the well-known principle of Disjunctive Rationality; it is
called Conjunctive Rationality in Rott (2020). Like its dual,
Conjunctive Rationality is a non-Horn condition. Another
non-Horn condition is the right-to-left direction of (2b).
The presence of non-Horn conditions means that reason-
ing with difference-making conditionals is not trivial. In or-
der to determine what may be inferred from a knowledge
base containing difference-making conditionals, we cannot
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simply use the axioms as closure operators. This is anal-
ogous to the problem of rational consequence relations in
the sense of Lehmann and Magidor (1992) that have made
it necessary to invent special inference methods like ratio-
nal closure/system Z and c-representations. In the follow-
ing, we will use the method of c-representations to deal with
difference-making conditionals. A major part of our task
ahead may be described as doing for c-representations what
Booth and Paris (1998) achieved for rational closure.
4 Ranking semantics for difference-making
conditionals
In this section, we define a semantics for difference-making
conditionals in the framework of Spohn’s ranking functions.
We make use of standard conditionals and might condition-
als in order to express that the antecedent of the conditional
is relevant to the consequent. We justify our definition of
difference-making conditionals by showing that the Rele-
vant Ramsey Test holds and we show that the Basic prin-
ciples are satisfied.
Definition 3 (Relevant Ramsey Test for OCFs). Let κ be an
OCF, A  B be a difference-making conditional and ∗ a
revision operator for OCFs. We define the Relevant Ramsey
Test for OCFs as follows:
(RRTocf) κ |= AB iff B ∈ Bel(κ ∗A) and
B 6∈ Bel(κ ∗A).
Using some basic properties of ranking functions, we can
reformulate (RRTocf) :
κ |= AB iff κ ∗A |= B and κ ∗A 6|= B. (1)
From (1), we obtain for A with κ(A), κ(A) <∞:
κ |=AB iff κ |= {(B|A), /B|A .} (2)
iff both of the following two conditions hold:
κ(AB) < κ(AB) and (3)
κ(AB) ≤ κ(AB). (4)
Difference-making conditionals defined by (RRTocf) can be
expressed by pairs of conditionals. The first conditional
(B|A) corresponds to the first part of the (RRTocf) , B ∈
Bel(κ ∗ A), using basically the standard Ramsey Test. The
clause for (RRTocf) implies the clause for the standard Ram-
sey Test. The second conditional /B|A . corresponds to the
second part of the (RRTocf) , namely B 6∈ Bel(κ ∗ A). We
now continue with Example 1 in order to elucidate our re-
formulation in (2).
Example 2 (Continue Example 1). The agent’s pipe broke
because the temperatures were too low, and therefore she
had to call a plumber to have the pipe fixed. These connec-
tions can be expressed using difference-making condition-
als c  b and b  p. Applying (2), we can reformulate
∆ = {c  b, b  p} = {(b|c), / b|c ., (p|b), / p|b .}. The
standard conditionals express that if it is cold, then the pipe
will break, and if the pipe breaks, then the agent will call a
plumber. But the reason relation would get neglected if we
only used standard conditionals. The might conditionals ex-
press that if it is not cold, then the pipe might not break, and
if the pipe does not break, we might not call the plumber.
Here the might conditionals formulated in natural language
perhaps sound a bit odd, but together with the standard con-
ditionals they express the reason relations introduced by the
difference-making conditionals.
Next, we turn to the basic principles for difference-
making conditionals. Note that when checking the princi-
ples of Rott, instead of a general epistemic state Ψ, we use a
ranking function κ.
Theorem 1. Let κ be a ranking function and let κ |= AB
be as defined in (2). Then · · satisfies the basic principles
of difference-making conditionals.
Proof. (0): We show that κ |= ⊥⊥, i.e., κ∗⊥ |= ⊥ and
κ∗> 6|= ⊥. These are true by the success and consistency
conditions for revisions, respectively.
(1): Let κ |= A  BC. We have to show that κ |= A 
B or κ |= A  C. Via (2) it follows that we have to
show that κ(ABC) < κ(A(B ∨C)) and κ(A(B ∨C)) ≤
κ(ABC) implies κ(AB) < κ(AB), κ(AB) ≤ κ(AB),
or κ(AC) < κ(AC), κ(AC) ≤ κ(AC).
From κ(ABC) < κ(A(B ∨ C)), we derive κ(ABC) <
κ(AB ∨ AC) = min{κ(AB), κ(AC)}, and hence both
κ(ABC) < κ(AB) and κ(ABC) < κ(AC). Since
ABC |= AB,AC we obtain κ(AB) < κ(AB) and
κ(AC) < κ(AC).
Moreover, from κ(A(B∨C)) ≤ κ(ABC), we derive that
either κ(AB) ≤ κ(ABC) or κ(AC) ≤ κ(ABC). Since
ABC |= AB,AC we obtain that either κ(AB) ≤ κ(AB)
or κ(AC) ≤ κ(AC).
(2a): We have to show that κ |= A  C iff (κ |= A 
AC and κ |= A A∨C). Via (2) it follows that we have
to show that κ(AC) < κ(AC) and κ(AC) ≤ κ(AC) iff
(κ(AC) < κ(AC) and κ(A) ≤ κ(⊥)) and (κ(A) < κ(⊥)
and κ(AC) ≤ κ(AC)). This holds trivially.
(2b): We have to show that κ |= A AC iff (not κ |=
AA ∨ C and κ |= AA). Via (2) it follows that we
have to show that κ(AC) < κ(AC), κ(A) ≤ κ(⊥) iff
(κ(A) ≥ κ(⊥) or κ(AC) < κ(AC)) and κ(A) < κ(⊥)
and κ(A) ≤ κ(⊥). This holds trivially.
(3–4): We have to show that κ |= ⊥  A ∨ C iff (κ |=
⊥  A and κ |= A  A ∨ C). Via (2) it follows that
we have to show that κ(AC) ≤ κ(A ∨ C) iff κ(A) ≤
κ(A) and κ(AC) ≤ κ(AC). The direction from left to
right is immediate. For the converse direction, note that
κ(AC) ≤ κ(AC) implies that κ(AC) = κ(A). So we get
from κ(A) ≤ κ(A) and κ(AC) ≤ κ(AC) that κ(AC) ≤
min{κ(A), κ(AC)} = κ(A ∨ C), as desired.
(5): We have to show that κ |= A∨B  ⊥ iff (κ |= A
⊥ and κ |= B  ⊥). But conditionals with impossible
consequents are accepted iff the antecedents are impossi-
ble, i.e., have κ-rank ∞. So the claim follows from the
fact that κ(A ∨B) = min{κ(A), κ(B)}.
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⊥⊥ κ ∗ > 6|= ⊥ Bel(κ) is consistent
A⊥ κ ∗A |= ⊥ A is a doxastic
impossibility
A⊥ κ ∗A |= ⊥ A is a doxastic
necessity
⊥A κ ∗ > 6|= A A is a non-belief
AA κ ∗A 6|= A A is contingent
AAC κ ∗A |= C C is in Bel(κ ∗A)
and κ ∗A 6|= ⊥ and A is contingent
AA ∨ C κ ∗A 6|= C C is not in Bel(κ ∗A)
not AA ∨ C κ ∗A |= C C is in Bel(κ ∗A)
Table 1: The meanings of some basic difference-making condition-
als.
(6): If Cn(A) = Cn(B) and Cn(C) = Cn(D), then
A  C iff B  D. This follows trivially since struc-
turally analogous compounds of logically equivalent sen-
tences are logically equivalent and thus get the same κ-
ranks.
The basic principles explore the logic of conditionals gov-
erned by (RRT). The reformulation in Definition 3 shows
that the notion of the Relevant Ramsey Test can be trans-
ferred to the OCF framework. The relevance of the an-
tecedent to the consequent can be expressed by splitting
the two directions within the (RRTocf) into two condition-
als, one might and one standard conditional. In Theorem 1,
we have shown that this reformulation serves the logic be-
hind difference-making conditionals. Theorem 1 should be
compared with the results of Raidl (2020).
Rott (2019) explained the meanings of some basic
difference-making conditionals, and the explanations still
work within the OCF framework. They are collected in ta-
ble 1. Note that the meanings also reflect the idea of the basic
principles. For example, (2a) says that C is in the revision
of κ ∗ A and not in the revision κ ∗ A iff A  AC and
AA∨C, which is exactly the meaning of these two basic
difference-making conditionals. Also for (2b) the mean-
ings of the difference-making conditionals of both sides of
‘iff’ are exactly the same.
5 Inductive representation of
difference-making conditionals
In this section, we define an inductive representation of sets
of difference-making conditionals ∆ by setting up epis-
temic states in form of OCFs that are admissible with respect
to ∆. We use the approach of c-representations firstly in-
troduced by Kern-Isberner (2001). C-representation are not
only capable of setting up epistemic states that represent sets
of standard conditionals but were extended to might condi-
tionals (see Eichhorn, Kern-Isberner and Ragni 2018). By
combining the representation of standard and might con-
ditionals, we get a c-representation of sets of difference-
making conditionals.
First, we will turn to the application of the technique of
c-representations to sets of standard and might conditionals.
Proposition 2 (C-representation of sets of standard and
might conditionals). Let ∆ = {(Bi|Ai)}i=1,...,n ∪
{/Bi|Ai .}i=n+1,...,m be a set of standard and might con-






with non-negative impact factors κ−i for each conditional














for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. If i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, i.e. the impact fac-
tor stands for a standard conditional, then we need strict
inequalities ‘>’. If i ∈ {n + 1, . . . ,m}, i.e. the impact fac-
tor stands for a might conditional, then we do not need strict
inequalities and ‘≥’ is sufficient.
To calculate a c-representation of a set of conditionals ∆
we need to solve a system of inequalities, given by formula
(6) for each i = 1, . . . ,m, which ensure κc∆ |= ∆. More
precisely, with the ranks of formulas, and formula (5) the
constraint κc∆(AiBi) < κ
c
∆(AiBi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n resp.





















The left minimum ranges over the models AiBi, so the con-
ditional (Bi|Ai) resp. /Bi|Ai . is not falsified by any consid-
ered world and thus κ−i is no element of any sum (7a). As
opposed to this, the right minimum ranges over the models
of AiBi, so the conditional (Bi|Ai) resp. /Bi|Ai . is falsi-
fied by every considered world and thus κ−i is an element of





























for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. As we have seen, save for the strict-
ness the inequalities defining impact factors for standard and





’. Also note that c-representations are not
unique since the solution of the system of inequalities is not
unique. If the system of inequalities in (6) has a solution
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then ∆ is consistent and (5) is a model of ∆. For the con-
verse, Kern-Isberner (2001, p. 69, 2004, p. 26) has shown
that every finite consistent knowledge base consisting solely
of standard conditionals has a c-representation; but it is still
an open question whether this result extends to knowledge
bases including might conditionals.
According to (2), a difference-making conditional AB
can be reformulated as a set of a standard and a might con-
ditional {(B|A), /B|A .}. So, for a set of difference-making
conditionals ∆ = {AiBi | i = 1, . . . , n}, ∆ can be
implemented via {(Bk|Ak) | k = 1, . . . , n} ∪ {/Bl|Al . |
l = 1, . . . , n}. In this way, we can get an inductive repre-
sentation of ∆ by a c-representation as follows:
Definition 4 (C-representation for sets of difference-making
conditionals). Let ∆ = {Ai  Bi | i = 1, . . . , n} be
a set of difference-making conditionals. An OCF κ is a c-










with non-negative impact factors κ−k resp. λ
−
l for each con-











































Equations (11) and (12) ensure that the impact factors are
chosen such that κc∆ |= ∆. Just like in (6), (11) resp. (12)
follows from the success condition in (3) resp. (4). Since
we chose different impact factors κ− resp. λ− for the stan-
dard resp. the might conditionals, the terms in the minima
look more complex even though they can be derived from
(6). Also we replaced the general form of might conditionals
/B|A . by the more specific might conditional /Bi|Ai ., tak-
ing advantage of the special structure of difference-making
conditionals. C-representations of difference-making condi-
tionals exist iff all inequalities (11) and (12) are solvable.
Sets of difference-making conditionals, can be inductively
represented by a c-representation. The crucial part is the re-
formulation of difference-making conditionals as sets of one
standard and one might conditional in (2). Due to the high
adaptability of the approach of c-representations, it is possi-
ble to deal with such a set of mixed conditionals.
In order to illustrate c-representations of difference-
making conditionals, we now turn to the special case when
the set ∆ consists just of one difference-making condi-
tional ∆ = {AB}. In this case, the system of inequal-
ities always has a solution and we can define the κc∆ as
follows:
Theorem 3. LetAB be a difference-making conditional.
κcAB is a c-representation of AB iff there are integers
κ−st, κ
−





κ−st, ω |= AB
κ−w , ω |= AB
0, else
, for all ω ∈ Ω (13)
and
κ−st > 0 and κ
−
w ≥ 0 (14)
Proof. Let ∆ = {AB}. Since AiBiAiBi ≡ ⊥, (13)
follows immediately from (10). κ−st > 0 follows from (11)
and κ−w ≥ 0 follows from (12), since there are no other
difference-making conditional to interact with.
Let us now continue with our example concerning the
agent’s broken pipe:
Example 3 (Continue Example 2). Using the representation
of the set of difference-making conditionals ∆ = {c 
b, b p} as pairs of standard and weak conditionals from
Example 2, we can construct a c-representation κc∆ using
Definition 4. First we have to solve the system of inequalities
defining the impact factors. Let κ−1 and λ
−
1 correspond to the
standard and the might conditional representations of cb,
and let κ−2 and λ
−
2 apply similarly to bp:
κ−1 > min{0, κ−2 } −min{0, λ−2 } = 0,
λ−1 ≥ min{0, λ−2 } −min{0, κ−2 } = 0,
κ−2 > min{0, λ−1 } −min{0, λ−1 } = 0,
λ−2 ≥ min{0, κ−1 } −min{0, κ−1 } = 0.
The minima on the left-hand side range over worlds veri-
fying the corresponding (standard resp. might) conditional
and the minima on the right-hand side range over worlds
falsifying these. We take the minimum of the summed up im-
pact factors indicating that other conditionals are falsified.
Since the impact factors are non-negative the minima equal
zero. We choose κ−1 = κ
−




2 = 0 and
get the c-representation presented in table 2. It is easy to
verify that κc∆ |= cp, so in this example the difference-
making conditionals satisfy transitivity. Note, however, that
transitivity is only ‘valid by default’, that is, it can easily be
undercut by the addition of another premise. For instance, it
is possible to consistently add c p as a third premise to
∆. The extended knowledge base has a c-representation
(based on κ−1 = κ
−
3 = 2, κ
−







that does not satisfy c p because it does not even satisfy
(p|c).
6 Revision by difference-making conditionals
In this section we discuss a revision method for epistemic
states represented by an OCF with one difference-making
conditional. Therefore, we make use of the characterisation
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ω κc∆(ω) ω κ
c
∆(ω)
cbp 0 cbp λ−1 = 0





cbp κ−1 + λ
−
2 = 1 cbp λ
−
2 = 0
cbp κ−1 = 1 cbp 0
Table 2: The ranking function κc∆ of Example 3.
of a difference-making conditional as a set of one standard
conditional and one might conditional in (2) and provide a
method for simultaneously revising an epistemic state with
a standard and a might conditional.
C-revisions, introduced by Kern-Isberner (2001), provide
a highly general framework for revising epistemic states by
sets of conditionals. In the framework of ranking functions,
c-revisions are capable of revising an OCF by a set of con-
ditionals with respect to conditional interaction within the
new information, while preserving conditional beliefs in the
former belief state. This is all depicted in the principle of
conditional preservation, which implies the Darwiche-Pearl
postulates for revising epistemic states (Kern-Isberner 2001,
2004). We will now introduce a simplified version of c-
revisions for sets of standard and might conditionals.
Proposition 4 (C-revisions by sets of standard and might
conditionals). Let κ be an OCF specifying a prior epistemic
state and let ∆ = {(Bi|Ai) | i = 1, . . . , n}∪{/Bi|Ai . | i =
n + 1, . . . ,m} be a set of standard and might conditionals
which represent the new information. Then a c-revision of κ
by ∆ is given by an OCF of the form




with non-negative impact factors κ−i for each conditional
















κ0 is a normalization factor to ensure that κ∗∆ is an OCF.
The κ−i can be considered as impact factors of the single
conditional (Bi|Ai) ∈ ∆ resp. /Bi|Ai . ∈ ∆ for falsifying
the conditionals in ∆ which have to be chosen so as to en-
sure success κ∗∆ |= ∆ by (16). As before, we use ‘(≥)’ as a
dummy operator which is replaced by the strict inequality
symbol > for standard conditionals, while for might condi-
tionals it is replaced by the inequality symbol ≥. From the
success condition κ∗∆(AiBi) (≤) κ∗∆(AiBi) and the ranks of
formulas, it holds that
min
ω|=AiBi













Since κ0 is a constant factor, it can be removed from the in-
equality. As in c-representation, the factor κ−i is no element
of the left sum, whereas the right sum ranges over worlds
falsifying (Bi|Ai) resp. /Bi|Ai . and therefore the factor κ−i
is an element of every sum. With these deliberations we can
rewrite the inequalities to (16) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Note that
the impact factors defining c-revisions are not unique be-
cause there are multiple solutions of the system of inequal-
ities in (16). The question as to which choice of the impact
factors is ‘best’ is part of our ongoing work.
Now we turn to the revision of an epistemic state by a
single difference-making conditional in the framework of
OCFs. In (2) we showed that the revision by a difference-
making conditional is equivalent with revising a ranking
function by a special set of conditionals, since A  B
corresponds to {(B|A), /B|A .}. Thus, we need a revision
method which is capable of dealing with a mixed set of
conditionals. As we have seen before, c-revisions are an
adaptable revision method for sets of conditionals, both for
standard and for might conditionals. Following the general
schema of c-revisions, we get:
Definition 5 (C-revision by a difference-making condi-
tional). Let κ be an OCF specifying a prior epistemic state
and let AB = {(B|A), /B|A .} be a difference-making
conditional which represents the new information. Then a
c-revision of κ by AB is given by an OCF of the form
κ ∗AB(ω) = κ∗∆(ω)
= κ0 + κ(ω) +
{
κ−st, ω |= AB
κ−w , ω |= AB
(17)
with
κ−st > κ(AB)− κ(AB) (18)
κ−w ≥ κ(AB)− κ(AB). (19)
As before, κ0 is a normalization factor. The premises
of the standard and the might conditional defining the
difference-making conditional AB are exclusive, so the
set A B = {(B|A), /B|A .} is consistent and κ∗∆ al-
ways exists. The form of κ∗∆ in (17) follows from (15):
κ ∗ (AB)(ω) = κ ∗ {(B|A), /B|A .}(ω)







Since AB and AB are exclusive and we revise with just a
single difference-making conditional, we get (17). The suc-
cess condition for the standard conditional (B|A) in (3) and
the success condition for might conditional /B|A . in (4)
lead to inequalities defining impact factors κ−st resp. κ
−
w . For












The minimal range over worlds AB resp. AB, so the might
conditional /B|A . are not falsified by any considered world
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ω κ∗(ω) ω κ∗(ω)
cbpd 0 cbpd 0
cbpd 0 + κ−w = 0 cbpd 0 + κ
−
w = 0
cbpd 1 cbpd 1
cbpd 1 + κ−w = 1 cbpd 1 + κ
−
w = 1
cbpd 1 + κ−st = 2 cbpd 0 + κ
−
st = 1
cbpd 1 cbpd 0
cbpd 1 + κ−st = 2 cbpd 0 + κ
−
st = 1
cbpd 1 cbpd 0
Table 3: Schematic c-revised ranking function κ∗ = κc∆ ∗(db)
of Example 4. Note that κ0 = 0 which is why it is not represented
in this table.
and thus the sums are empty and we get (18). Analogously,












The sums in the minima are empty because the strong con-
ditional is not falsified for any world satisfying AB resp.
AB. Conditions (18) and (19) ensure the success condition
κ∗∆w |= ∆w.
As we have seen, c-revision provides a revision method
for OCFs which can handle sets of standard and might con-
ditionals. The admissible impact factors allow for a combi-
nation of standard and might conditionals in the revision. To-
gether with the special structure of difference-making con-
ditionals, we obtain a revision method for epistemic states
which take a difference-making conditional as input and
therefore ensure that the premise of the conditional is rel-
evant for the antecedent.
Now we give an example of a c-revision by a single
difference-making conditional:
Example 4 (continue Example 3). The plumber arrives at
the agent’s house and tells her that another common rea-
son for broken pipes are deposits in the pipe (d). Since the
house is pretty old, the pipe could have also broken be-
cause of these deposits. The agent revises her belief state
κc∆ with the new information d  b = {(b|d), / b|d .}.
Note that κc∆(ċḃṗ) = κ
c
∆(ċḃṗḋ) with ȧ = {a, a} for
any boolean variable a. Using (18) and (19), we calculate
κ−st > κ
c
∆(bd) − κc∆(bd) = 0 and κ−w ≥ κc∆(bd) −
κc∆(bd) = 0, and choose κ
−
st = 1 and κ
−
w = 0. Using
Definition 4 we get κc∆ ∗ (d b) = κ∗ which is depicted
in table 3. Note that in κ∗ still the difference-making condi-
tional c b holds, so the new reason-relation between the
deposits and the broken pipe does not overwrite the connec-
tion between cold temperatures and the broken pipe.
7 Related Work
Difference-making conditionals establish a notion of rele-
vance for conditionals, namely that the antecedent A of a
conditional ‘If A, then B’ is relevant for its consequent B.
The idea of incorporating relevance into the analysis of con-
ditionals has been around for a long time, and several at-
tempts to implement this kind of connective have been made.
In this section, we explore and compare some of these ideas.
The earliest work establishing a tight connection between
conditionals and belief revision was Gärdenfors (1979). In
a similar vein Fariñas and Herzig (1996) uncover a strong
link between belief contraction (which is known to be dual
to belief revision) and dependence. Their idea is close to the
idea of relevance introduced in Rott (1986) and their work
is cited by Rott (2019). This is what Fariñas and Herzig un-
derstand by the phrase ‘B depends on A’:
FHD Ψ |= A; B iff B ∈ Bel(Ψ) and
B 6∈ Bel(Ψ−̇A).
SoB depends onA if and only ifB is believed in the current
belief state Ψ and B is no longer believed if A is withdrawn
from the belief set of Ψ. There are some notable differences
to the Relevant Ramsey Test. The most striking one is that
the domain of Fariñas and Herzig’s dependency relation is
restricted to the agent’s current belief set, since Ψ |= A; B
implies that A,B ∈ Bel(Ψ). It fails to acknowledge depen-
dencies between non-beliefs, i.e., propositions that the agent
either believes to be false or suspends judgement on, like the
propositions featuring in counterfactuals which typically are
non-beliefs.
A second strand of research to compare with the present
one is the study of conditionals incorporating relevance in a
probabilistic framework that was begun by Douven (2016)
and Crupi and Iacona (2019b). Crupi and Iacona (2019a)
suggested a non-probabilistic possible-worlds semantics for
the ‘evidential conditional’ that can be defined as follows:
CPC AB iff (B|A) and (A|B).
Let us call such conditionals contraposing conditionals.
Crupi and Iacona call a rule essentially identical to (CPC)
the ‘Chrysippus Test’ (Crupi and Iacona 2019a) and say that
it characterizes the evidential interpretation of conditionals
according to which ‘a conditional is true just in case its an-
tecedent provides evidence [or support] for its consequent.’
Raidl (2019) provided the first completeness proof for the
‘evidential conditional’ which has been improved in Raidl,
Crupi and Iacona (2020). Independently, Booth and Chan-
dler (2020, Proposition 12) hit upon the same concept of
contraposing conditionals and have started investigating it.
Rott (2020) raises doubts as to whether contraposition
really captures the idea of evidence or support. It is true
that contraposing conditionals do violate RW, and this vi-
olation was called the hallmark of relevance by Rott. Ex-
cept for that, contraposing conditionals are formally very
well-behaved as they validate, for example, Or, Cautious
Monotony, Negation Rationality and Disjunctive Rational-
ity. These principles are all violated by difference-making
conditionals. However, Rott argues that the contrastive no-
tion of difference-making is better motivated as an explica-
tion of evidence and support than contraposition. The Rel-
evant Ramsey Test—which can be found, under the name
‘Strong Ramsey Test’, already in Rott (1986)—has ancestors
in Gärdenfors’ (1980) notion of explanation and in Spohn’s
(1983) notion of reason which both encode the idea that the
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explanans (or the reason) should raise the doxastic status of
the explanandum (or of what the reason is a reason for).
If we define a ranking semantics for contraposing condi-
tionals using the framework of Spohn’s ranking functions,
we can compare these two notions of relevance from techni-
cal point of view. Let κ be a ranking function and AB be
a contraposing conditional with contingent A and B. Then
(CPCocf ) κ |= AB
iff κ |= (B|A) and κ |= (A|B)
iff both of the following two conditions hold:
κ(AB) < κ(AB) and (20)
κ(AB) < κ(AB). (21)
Difference-making and contraposing conditionals both re-
quire the acceptance of the standard conditional (B|A), but
they differ in the case when the antecedent is denied. Com-
pare (20) and (21) with (3) and (4). Difference-making con-
ditionals require the AB-worlds to be more or equally plau-
sible as the AB-worlds stressing that the denial of the an-
tecedent should not lead to acceptance of the consequent.
For contraposing conditionals, the denial of the consequent
leads to denial of the antecedent, so someAB-worlds are re-
quired to be strictly more plausible than all the AB-worlds.
Difference-making conditionals place inequality constraints
on all possible worlds in Ω{A,B}, whereas contraposing con-
ditionals do not deal with the position of AB-worlds at all.
To give a feel for the contrast between difference-making
conditionals and contraposing conditionals, we present an
example from Rott (2020) and transfer it to the framework
of ranking functions. Suppose an infectious disease breaks
out with millions of cases, and consider the following two
scenarios concerning a treatment:
Scenario 1: Almost all of the people infected were admin-
istered a medicine and almost all of them have recovered.
However, only few of the persons who did not receive the
medicine have recovered.
Scenario 2: Only very few of the people infected were ad-
ministered the medicine. But fortunately, most people end
up recovering anyway. It turns out that within the group
of people who got the medicine slightly less people have
recovered than within the group who did not get it.
We compare these two scenarios and imagine an agent who
has contracted the disease, but of whom it is not know
whether she got the medicine. In Scenario 1, the fact that
the agent received the medicine would clearly support the
fact that she recovered, as it would clearly make the recov-
ery more likely. So we are justified in accepting the con-
ditional ‘If the agent received the medicine, she has recov-
ered’. However, in scenario 2 it does not make sense to apply
this conditional. It is likely that the agent has recovered, but
having received the medicine would not be evidence for the
recovery. We depict these two scenarios using ranking func-
tions. Let m stand for ‘the agent received the medicine’ and
r for ‘the agent recovered’. The ranking function κ1 with
κ1(mr) = 0, κ1(mr) = 1, κ1(mr) = 2 and κ1(mr) = 3
captures scenario 1 and κ2 with κ2(mr) = 0, κ2(mr) = 1,
κ2(mr) = 2 and κ2(mr) = 3 captures scenario 2.As we
can see κ1 |= m r, since κ1(mr) = 0 < 1 = κ(mr)
and κ1(mr) = 2 ≤ 3 = κ1(mr), but κ1 6|= m  r, since
κ1(mr) = 2 > 1 = κ1(mr). For the second scenario, it
holds κ2 |= m r but κ2 6|= mr. If we compare this with
our intuition towards the relation between medicine and re-
covery, we find that the difference-making conditional gets
the example right.
Another argument for the notion of relevance encoded
by difference-making conditionals is that they comply with
Spohn’s work who defines causation as follows:
A is a cause of B iff A and B obtain, A precedes B,
and A raises the metaphysical or epistemic status of
B given the obtaining circumstances. (Spohn 2012, p.
352)
As we can see, this is a compound of facts, times, obtaining
circumstances and a reason relation. We do not deal with
the first three components, but we can compare difference-
making conditionals with Spohn’s concept of reason. In
terms of ranking functions, A is a reason for B if the fol-
lowing inequality holds for a ranking functions κ:
κ(B|A)− κ(B|A) > κ(B|A)− κ(B|A). (22)
Compare Spohn (2012, p. 105, using the definition of two-
sided ranks τ(B|A) = κ(B|A) − κ(B|A)). Inequality (22)
expresses that the conditional (B|A) is stronger than (B|A).
Thus,A is a direct[!] cause ofB in Spohn’s sense just in case
A and B are true, the event represented by A precedes the
event represented by B and Spohn’s inequality (22) holds,
given the obtaining circumstances. For κ |= AB, equa-
tions (3) and (4) hold. Via the definition of ranks for condi-
tionals we first elaborate on (22):
(22) ⇔ κ(AB)− κ(A)− (κ(AB)− κ(A))
> κ(AB)− κ(A)− (κ(AB)− κ(A))
⇔ κ(AB)− κ(AB) > κ(AB)− κ(AB).
Now if κ |= A  B, then the left-hand side is posi-
tive, due to (3), whereas the right-hand side is not, due
to (4). So, the inequality expressing the notion of reason
defined by Spohn follows immediately from the definition
of difference-making conditionals as a set of standard and
might conditionals. As was pointed out by Eric Raidl (2020,
p. 17), A  C expresses that A is a ‘sufficient reason’ for
C in the terminology of Spohn (2012, pp. 107–108).
8 Conclusion
Difference-making conditionals aim at capturing the intu-
ition that the antecedent A of a conditional is relevant to its
consequent B, that A supports B or is a reason or evidence
for it. The Relevant Ramsey Test encodes this idea, ruling
that revising by the antecedent should lead to acceptance of
the consequent, which is the standard Ramsey Test, but also
ruling that revising by the negation of the antecedent should
not lead to the acceptance of the consequent. Rott (2019) de-
fined the Relevant Ramsey Test and difference-making con-
ditionals in a purely qualitative framework. In the present
paper we extended his approach to ranking functions by first
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transferring the Relevant Ramsey Test to the framework of
OCFs. We defined difference-making conditionals as a pair
consisting of a standard and a might conditional, which is
in full compliance with the basic principles that Rott iden-
tified for difference-making conditionals. Using this trans-
formation we benefitted from the flexible approach of c-
representations and c-revisions, defining an inductive repre-
sentation and a revision method for conditionals incorporat-
ing relevance. To the best of our knowledge, there is no other
revision method capable of dealing with not only sets of
conditionals but also sets of conditionals of different types,
namely standard and might-conditionals. Finally, drawing
on the ranking semantics for difference-making condition-
als, we compared different approaches to relevance or ev-
idence in conditionals. We showed that difference-making
conditionals express something very close to Spohn’s con-
cept of reason in the context of ranking functions, but that
they are fundamentally different from the evidential (or con-
traposing) conditionals studied by Crupi, Iacona and Raidl.
For future work we plan on elaborating on the inductive
representation of mixed sets of conditionals. Moreover, we
will continue working on the incorporation of relevance in
different kinds of epistemic states and examine different re-
vision methods for conditionals incorporating relevance.
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